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During intertemporal choice, humans tend to prefer small-sooner rewards over larger-
delayed rewards, reflecting temporal discounting (TD) of delayed outcomes. Functional
neuroimaging (fMRI) evidence has implicated the insular cortex in time-sensitive
decisions, yet it is not clear whether activity in this brain region is crucial for, or merely
associated with, TD behavior. Here, patients with damage to the insula (Insular patients),
control patients with lesions outside the insula, and healthy individuals chose between
smaller-sooner and larger-later monetary rewards. Insular patients were less sensitive
to sooner rewards than were the control groups, exhibiting reduced TD. A Voxel-
based Lesion-Symptom Mapping (VLSM) analysis confirmed a statistically significant
association between insular damage and reduced TD. These results indicate that the
insular cortex is crucial for intertemporal choice. We suggest that he insula may be
necessary to anticipate the bodily/emotional effects of receiving rewards at different
delays, influencing the computation of their incentive value. Devoid of such input, insular
patients’ choices would be governed by a heuristic of quantity, allowing patients to wait
for larger options.
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INTRODUCTION
Intertemporal choice requires weighting sooner temptations against long-term, larger gratifications.
In the laboratory, these situations may be modeled by manipulating the time at which rewards are
delivered. For example, a subject might choose between $5 now and $15 in 1 week. Humans, as
well as other animals, tend to prefer sooner-smaller over later-larger rewards (e.g., Ainslie, 1974).
The decrease in subjective value of a reward as the delay until its receipt increases is called temporal
discounting (TD; Ainslie, 1975).
Given the pervasive problems associated with short-sighted decision-making, such as addiction
and impulsivity (Bickel et al., 2007), there is increasing interest in specifying the neural
underpinnings of TD. Previous evidence suggests that intertemporal choice is governed by a
valuation process estimating the incentive value of different options, and a control process that
exerts top-down modulation over valuation, pursuing long-term goals (Peters and Büchel, 2011).
The medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) and ventral striatum, and the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, are core areas of the valuation and the control network, respectively (Rangel et al., 2008;
Figner et al., 2010; Sellitto et al., 2011).
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We hypothesize that another region crucially involved in TD
may be the insula. It has long been known that the insula is
implicated in decision-making. Several functional neuroimaging
(fMRI) studies have implicated the insula in choice about money,
drug, and other goods (e.g., Knutson et al., 2000; Guillem et al.,
2010; Tusche et al., 2010), especially during decisions involving
uncertainty (Huettel et al., 2006) and risk (Kuhnen and Knutson,
2005). Crucially, activity in the insula has been recently found
to modulate according to the time of availability of edible and
monetary outcomes (Tanaka et al., 2004; McClure et al., 2007;
Wittmann et al., 2007, 2010; Claus et al., 2011; Liu and Feng,
2012; Luo et al., 2012), suggesting that this brain region may
be implicated in intertemporal choice. fMRI evidence, however,
have not univocally associated insula activity with choice of either
delayed (Wittmann et al., 2007; Claus et al., 2011; Kayser et al.,
2012; Liu and Feng, 2012; Luo et al., 2012) or immediate options
(Tanaka et al., 2004; McClure et al., 2007; Wittmann et al., 2010),
and therefore its role in TD behavior is unclear. Moreover, fMRI
cannot clarify whether activity in a brain region is imperative
for, or instead spuriously associated with, a behavior of interest
(e.g., Rorden and Karnath, 2004; Poldrack and Farah, 2015).
To overcome this limitation, and provide causal evidence about
the role insula activity plays in intertemporal decision-making,
we used a lesion approach: if activity in the insula is crucial
for intertemporal choice, then patients with lesion to this brain
region should show abnormal TD behavior.
One plausible hypothesis is that the insula may influence
the probability of selecting sooner vs. later options based on
individuals’ physiological state (Volkow and Baler, 2015). The
insula has been associated with the conscious representation
of bodily states, and the anticipation of the bodily effects of
emotional events (Rolls, 1999; Damasio et al., 2000; Craig, 2009).
By signaling the current needs of the body, such inputs may
influence the valuation of different goods, and generate conscious
urges capable of driving behavior (e.g., Craig, 2009; Naqvi and
Bechara, 2009). During intertemporal choice, bodily signals may
convey the urge to obtain a reward soon, overwhelming attempts
to implement far-sighted decisions (Loewenstein, 1996; Camerer
et al., 2004). For this reason, we predicted that lesions to the
insula would decrease the appetitive value of sooner rewards,
leading to reduced TD.
In order to examine whether insula activity is crucial
for intertemporal choice, and begin to shed light on its
specific role for TD, patients with lesion to the insula (Insular
patients), control patients with lesions outside the insula,
and healthy participants chose between smaller-sooner rewards
and larger-later rewards (Experiment 1). In line with the
hypotheses, Insular patients showed reduced TD, and in a
corollary investigation (Experiment 2), reduced arousal for
positive stimuli.
EXPERIMENT 1
Materials and Methods
Participants
Participants included 25 patients with brain damage and
64 healthy individuals (see Table 1 for demographic and clinical
information). Patients were recruited at the Centre for Studies
and Research in Cognitive Neuroscience, Cesena, Italy, and at the
Spedali Civili of Brescia, Italy. They were selected on the basis
of the location of their lesion evident on magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) or computerized tomography (CT) scans, and
divided into two groups based on their lesion location.
Twelve patients (5 females) had lesions involving the insular
cortex, hidden in the lateral sulcus, covered by frontal, temporal,
and parietal opercula, as well as surrounding gray and white
matter (see Figure 1). Since lesions predominantly involved the
insular cortex (see ‘‘Results’’ Section), we henceforth refer to this
group as ‘‘Insular patients’’. Lesions were caused by an ischemic
or hemorrhagic stroke of the middle cerebral artery (MCA)
and were unilateral in all cases (left hemisphere: 8 cases, right
hemisphere: 4 cases). Thirteen patients (7 females) had brain
damage that spared the insular cortex in both hemispheres (see
Figure 2). We henceforth refer to this group as ‘‘Non-insular
patients’’. Lesions were caused by ischemic or hemorrhagic
stroke (9 cases) or tumor resection (4 cases), were unilateral in
all cases (left hemisphere: 7 cases, right hemisphere: 6 cases), and
mainly involved the occipital cortex, the temporal cortex, and the
superior frontal cortex. In no case did patients’ lesions involve
the mOFC (see Sellitto et al., 2010). There was no significant
difference in lesion volume between Insular patients and Non-
insular patients (33.33 vs. 25.36 cc.; p = 0.29).
All patients were in the chronic phase of recovery (at least
12 months post onset), were not receiving psychoactive drugs,
and had no other diagnosis likely to affect cognition or
interfere with the participation in the study (e.g., significant
psychiatric disease, alcohol abuse, history of cerebrovascular
disease). Patients’ general cognitive functioning was generally
preserved, as indicated by the scores they obtained in the Mini-
Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein et al., 1975), the digit
span forward test (DS), and the Colored Raven Matrices (CRM),
TABLE 1 | Participant groups’ demographic and clinical data [mean (standard deviation)].
Sex (M/F) Age (years) Education (years) BDI-II MMSE DS CRM Lesion volume (cc.)
Insular (n = 12) 7/5 60.6 (14) 10.5 (4.9) 10.6 (8.7) 25.1 (2) 5.0 (1.2) 28.8 (4.6) 33.3 (23.5)
Non-insular (n = 13) 6/7 58.9 (12.7) 10.1 (3.8) 9.9 (7.1) 25.6 (1.6) 5.8 (1.3) 25.5 (3.1) 25.4 (11.7)
HC (n = 64) 33/31 54.2 (14.5) 11.4 (4) – – – – –
Insular, patients with lesions in the insular cortex; Non-insular, patients with lesions outside the insula; HC, healthy controls; F, female; M, male; BDI-II, Beck Depression
Inventory Scale; MMSE, Mini Mental State Examination (corrected score); DS, digit span forward (corrected score); CRM, Colored Raven Matrices (corrected score).
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FIGURE 1 | Location and overlap of brain lesions in Insular patients. The image shows the lesions of the Insular patients projected on the same four axial
slices (A) and on the same four coronal slices (B) of the standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) brain. In each slice, the left hemisphere is on the left side. The
level of axial and coronal slices has been marked by white lines on the sagittal view of the brain. Sagittal views of the MNI brain show the degree of lesion coverage
for the right- and left-lesioned Insular patients; the color bar indicates the number of overlapping lesions (C).
FIGURE 2 | Location and overlap of brain lesions in Non-insular patients. The image shows the lesions of the Non-insular patients projected on the same
seven axial slices. In each slice, the left hemisphere is on the left side. The level of the axial slices has been marked by white lines on the sagittal view of the brain.
The color bar indicates the number of overlapping lesions in the axial slices.
which were within the normal range in all cases (Spinnler and
Tognoni, 1987; see Table 1). In addition, left-damaged patients
had no aphasia documented, and right-damaged patients had no
hemispatial neglect documented.
The healthy control group comprised 64 individuals
(31 females) matched to the patients on demographic ground,
including mean age, gender, and level of education. Control
participants were not taking psychoactive drugs, and were free of
current or past psychiatric or neurological illness as determined
by history.
All participants gave informed consent, according to the
Declaration of Helsinki (International Committee of Medical
Journal Editors, 1991) and the Ethical Committee of the
Department of Psychology, University of Bologna.
Lesion Analysis
Patients’ individual lesions, derived from the most recent clinical
MRI or CT images, were manually drawn by a neurologist (blind
to patients’ performance) directly on each slice of a T1-weighted
template MRI scan from the Montreal Neurological Institute
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(MNI1; see also Karnath et al., 2004; Moro et al., 2008; Tsuchida
and Fellows, 2012). This template is approximately oriented
to match Talairach space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) and
is distributed with MRIcron (Rorden and Brett, 2000). The
standard template provides various anatomical landmarks to
help experts plot the size and localization of the lesion using
structural features such as sulci and gyri as guides. This manual
procedure combines segmentation (identification of lesion
boundaries) and registration (to a standard template) into a
single step, with no additional transformation required (Kimberg
et al., 2007). Manual segmentation/registration procedures have
the limit to rely greatly on anatomical expertise, and to be
subjective in nature. On the other hand, they circumvent
problems frequently encountered by automated normalization
procedures, such as warping scans from individuals with
brain injury, which may be affected by structural distortions
related to the lesion and not easily compensated for (e.g.,
ventricular enlargement, large regions of atypical voxel intensity
values, etc), and combining subjects scanned with different
imaging modalities (e.g., MRI vs. CT; see Fiez et al., 2000;
Kimberg et al., 2007). MRIcron softwares were used to
estimate lesion volumes (in cc.) and to generate lesion overlap
images.
Figure 1 shows the extent and overlap of brain lesions in
Insular patients. As is evident, although all patients had damage
that included the insula, areas adjacent to the insula that are
within the MCA blood supply territories were damaged to
some degree as well. This included parts of the somatosensory
cortex, the basal ganglia (e.g., caudate, putamen), the temporal
lobe (especially the superior portions), the dorsolateral and/or
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the inferior parietal lobule, the
occipito-parietal junction, and the dorsomedial sectors of the
occipital lobe. Lesions of Insular patients overlapped maximally
in Brodmann Area (BA 20) (M = 7.0 cc., SD = 11.0 cc.), BA 21
(M = 2.7 cc., SD = 5.5 cc.), BA 38 (M = 2.1 cc., SD = 2.7 cc.),
and BA 22 (M = 1.3 cc., SD = 2.2 cc.), as well as not numbered
areas (M = 18.1 cc., SD = 6.4 cc.). Since the insular cortex is part
of the areas with no Brodmann label (e.g., Kurth et al., 2010), we
calculated maximal overlap location also using the Automated
Anatomical Labeling (AAL) template (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al.,
2002). This included the left (M = 6.6 cc., SD = 2.7 cc.) and the
right (M = 6.5 cc., SD = 1.3 cc.) insula, as well as the temporal
lobe bilaterally [temporal pole (M = 1.9 cc., SD = 2.4 cc.); superior
portions of the temporal lobe (M = 5.2 cc., SD = 3.3 cc.)].
Temporal Discounting Task
In a computerized TD task, participants chose between an
amount of reward that could be received sooner and an amount
of reward that could be received later. Two temporal conditions
were included. In the now condition, participants made a series
of choices between a smaller amount of money (in e) that could
be received immediately (now), and 40 e that could be obtained
after a variable delay. In the Not-now condition, choices involved
a smaller amount of money that could be received in 60 days,
and 40 e that could be delivered after a variable delay larger
1http://www.bic.mni.mcgill.ca/ServicesAtlases/ICBM152Lin
than 60 days, while maintaining the same temporal gaps between
earlier and later rewards as in the Now condition. Thus, in the
Now condition participants made five choices at each of six
delays: 2, 14, 30, 90, 180, and 365 days, whereas in the Not-now
condition the delays were 62, 74, 90, 150, 240, and 425 days
(see also Kable and Glimcher, 2010).
Within each block of five choices, the amount of the sooner
reward was adjusted based on the participant’s previous choice,
using a staircase procedure that converged on the amount of
the sooner reward that was equal, in subjective value, to the
later reward. The first choice was between a later amount of
40 e and a sooner amount of 20 e. If the sooner reward was
chosen, then the amount of the sooner reward was decreased
on the next trial; if the later reward was chosen, then the
amount of the sooner reward was increased on the next trial.
The size of the adjustment in the sooner reward decreased
with successive choices: the first adjustment was half of the
difference between the sooner and the later reward, whereas
for subsequent choices it was half of the previous adjustment
(Myerson et al., 2003). This procedure was repeated until
the subject had made five choices at one specific delay, after
which the subject began a new series of choices at another
delay/temporal condition. For each trial in a block, the sooner
amount represented the best guess as to the subjective value of
the later reward. Therefore, the sooner amount that would have
been presented on the sixth trial of a delay block was taken as
the estimate of the subjective value of the later reward at that
delay.
Moreover, two control conditions were included. In one,
subjects made five choices between 40 e and a smaller
amount of money, both available immediately. In the other,
participants made five choices between 40 e and a smaller
amount of money, both available in 365 days. The amount
of the smaller option of the two control conditions was
adjusted based on the staircase procedure described above.
Both patients and healthy subjects always chose the larger
reward in the two control conditions, suggesting adequate
comprehension of the task as well as adequate sensitivity to
reward.
The blocks of choices pertaining to the two temporal and
control conditions were interspersed, and the order of blocks of
choices relative to different delays of both temporal conditions
was randomized for each participant.
Participants did not receive the actual consequences of
their choices, but instead made choices about hypothetical
rewards. While using hypothetical rewards has both
advantages and disadvantages, there is no evidence that
hypothetical rewards are discounted differently from real
rewards, either in terms of the degree, shape, and neural
bases of TD (Johnson and Bickel, 2002; Bickel et al., 2009).
Moreover, in a previous work, we confirmed our results
on hypothetical rewards using real rewards (Sellitto et al.,
2010).
Self-Report Depression Scale
Given that the insular cortex has been implicated in depression
(e.g., Takahashi et al., 2010; Sprengelmeyer et al., 2011),
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patients in the present experiment were administered the
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996; Ghisi
et al., 2006), a 21-item self-report questionnaire evaluating
the presence and the severity of several aspects of depression
symptoms. The BDI-II assesses, on a 4-point Likert scale,
two components of depression: the affective component
(AC subscale, e.g., ‘‘I do not expect things to work out
for me’’), and the somatic component (SC subscale, e.g.,
‘‘I have less energy than I used to have’’; e.g., Steer
et al., 1999). A total score between 0 and 13 indicates
minimal depression, 14–19 indicates mild depression, 20–28
indicates moderate depression, and 29–63 indicates severe
depression.
Procedure
Before the beginning of the experimental session, participants
were told that, on each trial, two hypothetical amounts of money
would appear on the screen. One could be received sooner, and
one could be received later. They were informed that there were
no correct or incorrect choices, and were required to indicate
the option they preferred by pressing one of two buttons (Sellitto
et al., 2010).
Figure 3 illustrates the experimental paradigm. Each trial
began with a 1 s fixation screen, followed by a screen depicting
the two available options. The two options appeared on the
left and right side of the screen, indicating the amount and
the delay of delivery of the reward. After the participants made
their decisions, the non-chosen option disappeared, whereas the
preferred option remained on the screen for 1 s with a triangle
underneath it. The inter-trial interval was 1.5 s.
Once the TD task was over, patients were administered the
BDI-II.
Data Analysis
For each task, the rate at which the subjective value of a reward
decays with delay (TD rate) was assessed through two indices:
the TD parameter (k; Mazur, 1987; Rachlin et al., 1991; Green and
Myerson, 2004), and the area under the empirical discounting
curve (AUC; Myerson et al., 2001).
Estimation of k
The hyperbolic function SV = 1/(1 + kD), where SV = subjective
value (expressed as a fraction of the delayed amount), and
D = delay between the two options (in days), was fit to
the data to determine the k constant of the best fitting
TD function, using a nonlinear, least squares algorithm (as
implemented in StatisticaStatsoftr). The larger the value of
k, the steeper the discounting function, the more participants
were inclined to choose smaller sooner rewards over larger
later rewards. Subjective preferences were well characterized by
hyperbolic functions, as indexed by high R2 across participant
groups and temporal conditions (R2 > 0.64 in all cases). For
comparison purposes, we also assessed the fits to the data
of an exponential discounting model. For each TD task, the
exponential function SV = exp−kD was fit to the data to
determine the k constant of the best fitting function. The
hyperbolic function proved to fit the data better than the
exponential functions across participant groups and temporal
conditions. We entered R2 scores as the dependent variable
in an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Group [Insular
patients, Non-insular patients, healthy controls (HC)] as a
between-subject factor, and Model (hyperbolic, exponential)
and Temporal condition (Now, Not-now) as within-subject
factors. There was a significant effect of Model (F(1,86) = 16.0,
p = 0.0001). Post hoc comparisons, performed with the Fisher
test, showed that R2 values were significantly higher for
the hyperbolic than the exponential model (0.72 vs. 0.66,
p = 0.000001). No other effects were significant (p > 0.19
in all cases). Given the superiority of the hyperbolic over
the exponential model in describing TD behavior, hyperbolic
k values were adopted as measures of TD. The hyperbolic
k constants were normally distributed after log-transformation
FIGURE 3 | Experimental paradigm. In each trial, after a 1 s-fixation period, subjects chose between a small amount of reward delivered sooner and a larger
amount of reward delivered after a longer delay. The preferred option remained highlighted for 1 s. The upper panel refers to a choice trial in the Now condition.
The lower panel refers to a choice trial in the Not-now condition. See “Experiment 1” Section for a more detailed explanation of procedures.
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(Kolmogorov-Smirnov d < 0.09, p > 0.20 in all cases),
and therefore comparisons were performed using parametric
statistical tests.
Estimation of AUC
Although hyperbolic functions captured participants’ TD
behavior relatively well, we also obtained AUC as an additional
index of TD rate that, unlike k, does not depend on theoretical
models regarding the shape of the discounting function (see
Myerson et al., 2001). After delays and subjective values were
normalized, delays were expressed as a proportion of the
maximum delay, and subjective values were expressed as a
proportion of the greater amount (40 e). Delays and subjective
values were then plotted as x and y coordinates, respectively,
to construct a discounting curve. Vertical lines were drawn
from each x value to the curve, subdividing the area under the
curve into a series of trapezoids. The area of each trapezoid
was calculated as (x2 − x1)(y1 + y2)/2, where x1 and x2
are successive delays, and y1 and y2 are the subjective values
associated with these delays (Myerson et al., 2001). The AUC
is the sum of the areas of all the trapezoids and varies between
0 and 1. The smaller the AUC, the steeper TD, the more
participants were inclined to choose smaller sooner rewards
over larger later rewards. The AUC scores were normally
distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov d< 0.10, p> 0.20 in all cases),
and therefore comparisons were performed using parametric
statistical tests.
Voxel-Based Lesion-Symptom Mapping (VLSM)
Standard groupwise comparisons were supplemented with
a Voxel-based Lesion-Symptom Mapping (VLSM) analysis
oriented at investigating the relation between brain damage
and behavior on a voxel-by-voxel basis. VLSM allows lesion-
behavior associations to be tested without assigning patients
to arbitrary groups. In this method, a behavioral measure
is entered as the dependent variable, and the lesion status
of each voxel (lesioned or not) is the independent variable.
Then, for each voxel, statistical comparisons are made between
the performance of subjects with vs. without lesions affecting
that voxel. The output is a statistical map indicating voxels
associated with poor performance when lesioned (Bates et al.,
2003).
We entered patients’ TD scores (k and AUC) in the
Non-Parametric Mapping software (NPM; Rorden et al.,
2007), separately for the Now and Not-now condition. The
software compares performance of patients with vs. without
damage at each voxel using the nonparametric Brunner-
Munzel (BM) rank-order test (Brunner and Munzel, 2000).
The higher the resulting statistical output (Z value) relative
to voxels in a given area, the stronger the association
between damage in that area and impaired performance.
Only voxels affected in at least 20% of cases were included
for the analysis. The alpha level of significance was set at
p < 0.05, corrected for False Discovery Rate (FTD; Nichols
and Hayasaka, 2003), and an extent threshold of 50 voxels
per cluster was adopted (see also Gläscher et al., 2010).
Results
Temporal Discounting
Figure 4 shows TD curves by participant group and temporal
condition. The k value for each curve reflects the geometric
mean of the group, and thus provides a better measure of
central tendency for positively skewed metrics—such as TD
rates—than does the arithmetic mean. Figure 5 shows the
AUC by participant group and temporal condition. As is
evident from the figures, Insular patients discounted future
rewards less steeply (Insular Patients, Now: geometric mean’
FIGURE 4 | Temporal discounting (TD) functions by participant group (Insular = patients with lesions in the insular cortex; Non-insular = patients with
lesions outside the insular cortex; HC = healthy controls) and type of temporal condition. The hyperbolic curves describe the discounting of subjective
value (expressed as a proportion of the delayed amount) as a function of time (days). The discounting parameter k reflects the geometric mean of the group.
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FIGURE 5 | Area under the empirical discounting curve (AUC) by
participant group (Insular = patients with lesions in the insular cortex;
Non-insular = patients with lesions outside the insular cortex;
HC = healthy controls) and type of temporal condition. The error bars
indicate the standard error of the mean.
k = 0.011, SD = 0.03; Not-now: geometric mean’ k = 0.005,
SD = 0.01) than the control groups (Non-insular patients, Now:
geometric mean’ k = 0.066, SD = 0.13; Not-now: geometric
mean’ k = 0.018, SD = 0.03; HC, Now: geometric mean’ k =
0.026, SD = 0.12; Not-now: geometric mean’ k = 0.014, SD =
0.27). For example, the delay at which 40 e decreased to 50%
of their original value (so that they were worth 20 e now)
was about 38 days for normal controls, but ∼90 days for
Insular patients. These impressions were confirmed by ANOVA
analyses.
k
An ANOVA on log-transformed k values with Group (Insular
patients, Non-insular patients, HC) as a between-subject factor,
and Temporal condition (Now, Not-now) as a within-subject
factor yielded a significant effect of Group (F(2,86) = 6.01,
p = 0.003). Post hoc comparisons, performed with the Fisher
test, showed that TD was less steep in Insular patients compared
to Non-insular patients (−2.12 vs. −1.46; p = 0.001) and HC
(−2.12 vs. −1.71; p = 0.008), whereas no significant difference
was detected between Non-insular patients and HC (p = 0.09).
Moreover, there was a significant effect of Temporal condition
(F(1,86) = 22.44, p = 0.000008), indicating that TD was generally
steeper in the Now compared to the Not-now condition (−1.57
vs. −1.88; p = 0.000002). There was no significant Group ×
Temporal condition interaction (F(2,86) = 1.39, p = 0.25).
AUC
Similar results were obtained using AUC as the dependent
variable. An ANOVA on AUC scores with Group and Temporal
condition as factors yielded a significant effect of Group
(F(2,86) = 4.79, p = 0.01). Fisher post hoc comparisons showed
that AUC was larger (i.e., TD was slower) in Insular patients
compared to Non-insular patients (0.49 vs. 0.28; p = 0.003) and
HC (0.49 vs. 0.38; p = 0.03), with no difference between the
latter two groups (p = 0.07). Again, there was a significant effect
of Temporal condition (F(1,86) = 14.91, p = 0.0002), indicating
smaller AUCs in the Now condition than in the Not-now
condition (0.35 vs. 0.40; p = 0.002), but no significant Group ×
Temporal condition interaction (F(2,86) = 2.69, p = 0.07).
Control analysis
Given that there were four Non-insular patients out of thirteen,
whose lesion involved the superior frontal cortex, and that
lesions in the frontal cortex can result in increased impulsivity
(Floden and Stuss, 2006; Olson et al., 2009), to exclude that
Non-insular patients performance was driven by these patients
we reran the main analyses excluding them from the sample.
We confirmed our results. In particular, in the ANOVA on log-
transformed k values a significant effect of Group (F(2,86) = 4.73,
p = 0.01) emerged, such that TD was less steep in Insular
patients compared to Non-insular patients (−2.12 vs. −1.49;
p = 0.005) and HC (−2.12 vs. −1.71; p = 0.01), whereas no
significant difference was detected between Non-insular patients
and HC (p = 0.22). Moreover, there was a significant effect
of Temporal condition (F(1,86) = 16.11, p = 0.0001), indicating
that TD was generally steeper in the Now compared to the
Not-now condition (−1.59 vs. −1.89; p = 0.00001). There
was no significant Group × Temporal condition interaction
(p = 0.53). The same applies for the analysis on AUCs: there
was a significant effect of Group (F(2,86) = 3.34, p = 0.04),
such that TD was less steep in Insular patients compared to
Non-insular patients (0.49 vs. 0.31; p = 0.02) and HC (0.49
vs. 0.37; p = 0.03), whereas no significant difference was
detected between Non-insular patients and HC (p = 0.26).
Moreover, there was a significant effect of Temporal condition
(F(1,86) = 12.05, p = 0.001), indicating that TD was generally
steeper in the Now compared to the Not-now condition (0.36 vs.
0.41; p = 0.006).
Choice Consistency
Further analyses were run in order to exclude that our results
were due to idiosyncratic TD behavior or inconsistent choices
on the Insular patients’ part. First, no participant in any group
followed a response heuristic, such as always selecting the larger-
delayed amount or the smaller-immediate amount across delay
and temporal conditions.
Turning to inconsistent choices, TD behavior should result,
by definition, in a monotonic decrease of the subjective value
of the future outcome with delay (Johnson and Bickel, 2008).
Thus, if R1 is the subjective value of a reward R delivered
at delay t1, R2 is the subjective value of R delivered at delay
t2, and t2 > t1, then it is expected that R2 < R1. Therefore,
subjects exhibit inconsistent preference when the subjective value
of the future outcome at a given delay is greater than that at
the preceding delay, i.e., R2 > R1 (Johnson and Bickel, 2008).
To allow variability in the data, we considered as indicative of
inconsistent preferences only those data points in which the
subjective value of a reward overcame that at the preceding delay
by a value of >10% of the future outcome, i.e., R2 > R1 + R/10,
as recommended by Johnson and Bickel (2008). An ANOVA on
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the number of inconsistent preferences (in which the subjective
value of a reward overcame that at the preceding delay by a
value of ≥10% of the future outcome) with Group (Insular,
Non-insular, HC) as a between-subject factor, and Temporal
condition (Now, Not-now) as a within-subject factor yielded
no significant effect of Group (F(2,86) = 0.58, p = 0.56), no
significant effect of Temporal condition (F(1,86) = 0.05, p = 0.82),
and no significant Group × Temporal condition interaction
(F(2,86) = 1.77, p = 0.18). These results indicate clearly that all
groups made a comparable number of inconsistencies in both
temporal conditions (mean number of inconsistent preferences
for the Now condition: Insular, 0.60; Non-insular, 0.90; HC, 0.70;
Not-now condition: Insular, 1.0; Non-insular, 0.70; HC, 0.60).
This held even if all deviations from a monotonically decreasing
function were counted as inconsistent preferences, regardless of
their magnitude, i.e., R2> R1 (all p’s> 0.20).
Together, the findings that lesion to the insular cortex did
not result in changes to the shape of the discounting function
(aside from its steepness), response heuristics or inconsistent
preferences, strongly suggest that Insular patients’ behavior
was indeed reflective of decreased TD, and not poor task
comprehension or idiosyncratic preferences.
VLSM
To investigate the relation between TD deficits and specific brain
lesions, we performed a VLSM analysis. The VLSM analysis
related patients’ k rates and AUC values for the Now and
Not-now conditions (in separate analyses) to their brain lesions.
Figure 6 shows the statistical power map, indicating the voxels
where we had adequate power to detect effects with a 5% FDR
threshold (Rorden et al., 2007; Gläscher et al., 2010). The brain
regions associated with reduced TD, along with the coordinates
of their center of mass, based on the MNI brain atlas, are listed in
Table 2 and shown in Figure 7.
As indicated in Table 2, the largest clusters and the highest
Z-values, for both the analysis on k and AUC values, were
located in the insula. In both cases, in the Now condition, the
highest concentration of significant voxels was in the right insula.
A second distinct cluster of significant voxels was located in the
left insula. There were other, smaller and less reliable clusters
of voxels associated with reduced TD, including more anterior
portions of the left insula and regions in the lateral temporal
lobe, as listed in Table 2. As well, in the Not-now conditions,
for both the analysis on k and AUC values, the voxels with the
highest Z-values were again located in the right insula, and in
an extended cluster in the left hemisphere—with peak in the left
fusiform gyrus for the analysis on k, and in the superior temporal
lobe for the analysis on AUC—that also included the insula.
Again, smaller and less significant clusters were detected in the
left temporal lobe.
Thus, the VLSM results confirm that the abnormal TD
behavior of Insular patients was mainly driven by damage to
the insula. As anticipated, the VLSM analysis also revealed
other regions, mainly in the temporal lobe, that were also
related to TD behavior, although less reliably. The emergence
of these additional regions in the VLSM analysis is difficult to
interpret, primarily because we have no hypotheses on their
putative role on TD. Additionally, damage in some of those
regions (operculum, superior temporal pole) correlates with
insula damage in this data set.
Self Report of Depression
Insular patients’ self-reports did not evince significantly higher
levels of depression at the BDI-II than did those of Non-insular
patients (F(1,23) = 0.27; p = 0.61; see Table 1). Separate analysis
on the scores from the affective and somatic subscales of the
BDI-II also failed to yield statistically significant results (p >
0.54 in both cases). Thus, any difference in the discounting
behavior of Insular andNon-insular patients cannot be explained
by increased level of depression in patients with insular cortex
lesion.
EXPERIMENT 2
Two corollary investigations were conducted. To provide support
to our hypothesis that decreased TD in Insular patients may
depend on reduced emotional responses during decision-
making, we had participants rate the valence and the arousal
evoked by positive, negative, and neutral stimuli (Emotion task).
Moreover, given that some studies have detected activity in the
insula during tasks requiring time perception (e.g., Craig, 2009;
Wittmann et al., 2010; Schirmer, 2011), we ran an additional task
aimed at excluding time estimation deficits in Insular patients
(Time estimation task).
FIGURE 6 | Statistical power map. Map showing the voxels (in red) where there is sufficient statistical power to detect an effect in this group of patients, overlaid
on the MNI brain. In each axial slice, the left hemisphere is on the left side. Z-coordinates of each axial slice are given.
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TABLE 2 | VLSM results.
Hemisphere x y z Cluster size (voxel) BA Max
k
Now condition
Insula Right 44 8 −10 4596 – 2.67
Insula Left −37 6 9 295 – 2.30
Temporal superior Left −63 3 −3 128 48 2.09
Temporal medial Left −51 −34 −15 97 20 2.05
Temporal inferior Left −50 −35 −24 276 20 2.04
Insula Left −34 21 6 333 48 1.96
Rolandic operculum Left −40 −19 14 61 48 1.93
Insula Left −36 18 −9 133 47 1.80
k
Not-now condition
Insula Right 41 8 −10 122 48 2.67
Fusiform gyrus Left −38 −15 −22 28021 20 2.45
Temporal superior Left −55 −14 13 76 48 1.69
AUC
Now condition
Insula Right 43 8 −10 9733 48 −2.67
Temporal inferior Left −50 −35 −24 276 20 −2.10
Temporal medial Left −51 −34 −15 97 20 −2.10
Insula Left −36 18 −9 133 47 −1.79
AUC
Not-now condition
Insula Right 44 8 −10 247 – −2.48
Temporal superior Left −57 2 1 11869 48 −2.37
Fusiform gyrus Left −38 −23 −25 838 20 −2.14
Coordinates of the regions associated with reduced TD in the VLSM analysis on both k and AUC values, in MNI space. Region labels are taken from the AAL. BA, Brodmann
area; Max, maximum BM Z statistics obtained for each cluster. Z scores are significant at a threshold of p < 0.05, FDR-corrected.
FIGURE 7 | Voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM) statistical map computed for k in the Now condition (A), k in the Not-now condition (B),
AUC in the Now condition (C), and AUC in the Not-now condition (D), thresholded at p < 0.05, FDR-corrected, and shown on representative axial
slices of the MNI brain. Z-coordinates of each axial slice are given.
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Materials and Methods
Participants
Participants included three patients from the Insular group of the
main experiment—recruited about 24 months after the primary
study—and one additional patient who had not taken part in the
main experiment (Insular patients; 3 males; right hemisphere:
2 cases; mean age = 44.2; SD = 19.0; mean education = 12;
SD = 1.5), and 12 healthy individuals matched to the patients on
age, education, and gender balance (3 females; mean age = 49.3;
SD = 12.5; mean education = 15.1; SD = 4.1; all p’s > 0.14). The
new Insular patient had lesion restricted to the anterior portion
of the right insula as well as to the right frontal operculum. His
cognitive functioning was in the normal range, as documented
by the DS forward test (corrected score = 5.75), and the CRM
(corrected score = 49.25; Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987).
Emotion Task
Twenty-five images were selected from the International
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 1999). Ten were
positively valenced (e.g., people smiling, relaxing places), 10 were
negatively valenced (e.g., people crying, scenes with weapons),
and five had a neutral content (e.g., objects, people with a neutral
expression). Mean valence levels from Lang et al. (1999) were
7.05, 3.32, and 5.08 for the positive, negative, and neutral set,
respectively, whereas mean arousal levels for the selected pictures
were 5.01, 4.74, and 4.31, and was not significantly different
across sets of pictures (p> 0.64). Stimuli were selected to sample
both social and nonsocial context.
Each picture was presented on a computer screen for
10,000 ms. Participants rated each picture using the Self-
Assessment Manikin (Lang et al., 1999), a 9-point scale allowing
self-report of valence, ranging from 1 (happy) to 9 (sad), and
arousal, ranging from 1 (activated) to 9 (relaxed).
Time Estimation Task
We used a time estimation task adapted from Livesey et al.
(2007). In each trial, two black squares (20 mm × 20 mm)
appeared consecutively on a white background, centrally, with a
700 ms blank screen gap. One of the two stimuli remained on the
screen 1000 ms longer than the other. In 16 trials, one stimulus
appeared for 1000 ms and the other for 2000 ms. In the other
16 trials, one stimulus appeared for 2000 ms and the other for
3000 ms. Two catch trials were included, in which one stimulus
remained on the screen for 1000 ms and the other for 3000 ms.
The order of shorter and longer stimuli was counterbalanced.
After the second stimulus, a yellow dot appeared centrally, which
required participants to indicate whether the first or the second
stimulus had lasted longer, using one of two buttons. There
was no time limit for responding. After an inter-trial interval of
1500 ms, indicated by a central fixation cross, a new trial began.
Results
Emotion Task
Arousal scores revealed that insular patients felt less activated
at the view of positive pictures than HC (Insular: M = 5.37,
SD = 0.96; HC: M = 3.98, SD = 0.82), Mann-Whitney U = 5.5,
p = 0.02. There was no difference between groups in arousal
scores for negative and neutral pictures, as well as in valence
ratings across all picture sets (all p’s> 0.33).
Time Estimation Task
No subject failed at catch trials. There was no difference in the
frequency of correct responses between groups (30 vs. 31),Mann-
Whitney U = 21, p = 0.70.
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated the role of the insular cortex in
intertemporal choice. Patients with lesions involving the insular
cortex, and healthy as well as brain-damaged controls made
choices between smaller-sooner and larger-later amounts of
money. Two temporal conditions were tested: in one, the earlier
quantity of money was delivered immediately, whereas in the
other it was delayed by 60 days. Lesion to the insula significantly
reduced TD of future rewards: Insular patients behaved more
patiently than control participants, being less sensitive to sooner
rewards. This finding held in both the Now and Not-now
condition. Notably, all participants, including Insular patients,
showed a significant decreased TD in the Not-now compared
to the Now condition: They behaved more impatiently when the
sooner option was available immediately than when both options
were delayed in time, replicating previous findings in healthy
individuals (Frederick et al., 2002; McClure et al., 2004; Green
et al., 2005; Figner et al., 2010; but see Kable and Glimcher, 2010).
It is important to note that reduced TD in Insular patients is
not likely to be attributable to a general effect of brain damage,
because Non-insular patients showed normal TD. Moreover,
in a previous report, we showed that patients with lesion to
the mOFC consistently prefer smaller-sooner over larger-later
reward (Sellitto et al., 2010), a behavior that is opposite to
the one exhibited by Insular patients. It is also unlikely that
our findings were due to a general insensitivity to reward, or
blatant problems at estimating the passage of time in Insular
patients. First, all patients consistently chose the larger reward in
the control conditions of the TD task. Second, Insular patients
behaved more impulsively in the Now compared to the Not-
now condition, and this tendency was as pronounced in Insular
patients as it was in the controls, indicating that Insular patients
were generally able to represent the passage of time. Moreover,
a corollary investigation task found no blatant deficits in time
estimation in Insular patients compared to healthy individuals.
Thus, our findings indicate that the insula plays a crucial
role during intertemporal choice, contributing to shape TD
behavior. Several fMRI studies detected activity in the insula
modulates according to the time of availability of edible and
monetary outcomes (Tanaka et al., 2004; McClure et al., 2007;
Wittmann et al., 2007, 2010; Claus et al., 2011; Liu and Feng,
2012; Luo et al., 2012). Increased insula activity, however, has
been reported in association with both delayed (Wittmann et al.,
2007; Claus et al., 2011; Kayser et al., 2012) and immediate
rewards (Tanaka et al., 2004; McClure et al., 2007; Wittmann
et al., 2010), and therefore its role in TDwas unclear. The fact that
Insular patients behaved more patiently than both healthy and
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brain-damaged controls, forgoing sooner rewards to receive later
ones, indicates that the insula is necessary during intertemporal
choice. This was confirmed by a VLSM analysis showing that
the association between lesions in the insula and abnormal
TD behavior was statistically significant. In particular, the less
steep TD evinced by Insular patients (compared to controls)
suggests that the insula is normally implicated in upregulating the
incentive value of relatively sooner reward options. How might
the insula accomplish such a role?
We argue that, during decision-making, the insula may
anticipate the emotional/bodily effects of different choice
options, contributing to their incentive value (Barrett et al.,
2007). In particular, in a TD task involving receiving rewards
at different delays, the insula may signal the urge to obtain a
reward as soon as possible. Damage to the insula, therefore,
would diminish the motivation to obtain a reward soon, allowing
patients to wait for larger-later outcomes, thus reducing TD. This
interpretation makes contact with extensive evidence implicating
the insula in craving associated with cigarette and alcohol
addiction, a paradigmatic condition of capitulation to immediate
rewards despite bad long-term consequences (e.g., Wang et al.,
2007; Hoffman et al., 2008; Paulus et al., 2009; Kenny, 2011; Claus
et al., 2011; Kang et al., 2012; Sutherland et al., 2012; Vaidya
et al., 2012). Crucially, lesion to the insula disrupts addiction to
smoking (Naqvi et al., 2007), as if the patients’ ‘‘body forgot the
urge to smoke’’ (p. 534), confirming that insula activity promotes
courses of action directed at satisfying current needs. Another
clinical population exhibiting an apparent ability to resist current
temptations is that of individuals with anorexia nervosa, who
sustain self-denial of food (Kaye et al., 2009). Anorexic patients,
too, show reduced TD (Steinglass et al., 2012), and functional
abnormalities in the insula (Frank et al., 2012; Gaudio and
Quattrocchi, 2012).
One may argue that, instead of reducing the urge for reward,
damage to the insula reduced the feeling of uncertainty related to
waiting for delayed rewards (Tom et al., 2007; Clark et al., 2008;
Christopoulos et al., 2009). Even though intertemporal choices
are not typically designed as risky choices, delay may influence
choice via the perceived risk of loss inherently associated
with waiting (Paulus et al., 2003; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005;
Knutson et al., 2007). Our TD task does not allow distinguishing
whether damage to the insula reduced the urge to obtain
something positive (a reward soon), or to avoid something
negative (the fear of loss related to waiting for a later reward).
Although gathered from a small sample, however, the finding
that in the control Emotion task Insular patients showed
decreased arousal for positive (but not negative or neutral)
pictures makes us lean towards the former interpretation. Insular
patients may be not sufficiently activated in response to positive
outcomes, such as monetary rewards, to seek them as soon as
possible.
Notably, in a previous report, we showed that mOFC-lesioned
patients consistently prefer smaller-sooner over larger-later
reward (Sellitto et al., 2010), a behavior that is opposite
to the one exhibited by Insular patients in the present
study. The two studies are not strictly comparable due to
methodological differences between the tasks used (including
different time frames, procedures, and types of reward).
However, we would like to offer an interpretation of the
mechanistic interplay between OFC and the insula during
intertemporal choice. It has been proposed that mOFC, along
with the adjacent medial prefrontal cortex and the ventral
striatum, takes part in a system representing the subjective
value of both immediate and delayed outcomes, under the
top-down control by lateral prefrontal cortex (Kable and
Glimcher, 2007, 2010; Christakou et al., 2009, 2011; Hare
et al., 2009; Figner et al., 2010). Within this network, mOFC
and adjacent medial prefrontal regions are thought to weight
the long-term outcome of choices (Schoenbaum et al., 2009;
Sellitto et al., 2010), possibly through prospection (Ciaramelli
and di Pellegrino, 2011), whereas the ventral striatum may
convey signals of immediate pain or pleasure (Bechara and
Damasio, 2005; Kringelbach, 2005). Insula possesses connections
with both the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the ventral
striatum (Reynolds and Zahm, 2005). Therefore, during
intertemporal choice, it may relay interoceptive inputs about
need states to both systems, determining the strength with
which individuals will pursue a reward option or the other
(Weller et al., 2009; Droutman et al., 2015). According to
this model, damage to mOFC would cause a problem valuing
future outcomes, leading to steep TD, whereas damage to
the insula would lead to ‘‘emotionally blunt’’ intertemporal
choices, which would tend to be based on a heuristic of
quantity, leading to reduced TD. This is, indeed, what we have
observed in brain-damaged patients (Sellitto et al., 2010; this
study).
Our results may have clinical implications. Several studies
have documented dysfunctional activation of the insula and
altered connectivity between the insula and other reward-related
brain regions in individuals with addiction, who also typically
show steep TD (e.g., Garavan et al., 2000; Li et al., 2000; Daglish
et al., 2003; Garavan, 2010; Droutman et al., 2015). Sutherland
et al. (2012) have proposed that functional alterations in the
insula and the addiction-related circuit may be even considered
as a biomarker of addiction treatments efficacy. Our study concur
with previous evidence (e.g., Naqvi et al., 2007) in suggesting that
treatments targeting processing in the insula may be effective in
reducing some aspects of addiction.
In conclusion, we have shown that damage to the insula
causes increased willingness to wait in intertemporal choice.
While far-sighted decision-making has obvious advantages, in
many situations in life it is important, and preferred, to pursue
current opportunities instead of waiting for potential future ones,
as captured in the popular saying ‘‘every missed chance is lost
forever’’. The present results point to the insula as crucial to
pursue current rewards, and take chances as soon as possible,
favoring action over prospection.
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